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NOTES

Ford v. Wainwright
The Eighth Amendment, Due Process
and Insanity on Death Row
I.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, both English and American Common Law
prohibited the execution of the presently insane.' Nearly all states that
continue to enforce the death penalty provide statutory procedures
for those who become insane after sentencing. 2 Up to this point in

1. See generally Feltham, The Common Law and the Execution of Insane
Prisoners,4 MELB. U.L. REV. 434, 466-67 (1964). See also Blackstone, Commentaries
24; E. COKE, THmR INSTITUTE 4,6 (London 1797) (1st Ed. London 1644); COLLINSON,
A TREATISE ON LAW CONCERNING IDIOTS, LUNATICS, AND OTHER PERSONS NON
COMPOS MENTIS (1812); 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 3435 (W. Stokes & E. Ingersoll ed. 1847) (1st ed. London 1716); 1 W. HAWKINS, PLEAS
OF THE CROWN 2 (6th ed. London 1787) (1st ed. London 1716); HAWLES, REMARKS
ON THE TRYAL OF CHARLES BATEMAN, IN 3 STATE-TRYALS 651, 652-53 (London 1719).

See generally Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the Presently
Incompetent, 32 STAN. L. REv. 765 (1980); Note, Insanity of the Condemned, 88
YALE L.J. 533 (1979) (detailed analysis of common law history of execution of the
insane).
2. See ALA. CODE § 15-16-23 (1982); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4021 (1978);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2622 (1977) (allows discretion); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3701
(West 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-101 (1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 406
(1982); FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2602 (1982) (allows
discretion, § 17-10-60 (1982); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, 1005-2-3 (1982); IND. CODE
ANN. § 11-10-4-1 (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. §'22-4006 (1981); MD. ANN. CODE art.
27 § 75 (Supp. 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 279, § 62 (Law. Co-op. 1985); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-19-57 (Supp. 1985); Mo. REv. STAT. § 552.060 (1986); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-14-221 (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2537 (1979); NEV. REv. STAT. § 176425 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:24 (1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82 (West
1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-14-4 (1984); N.Y. CoRREC. LAW § 656 (McKinney
Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1001 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.29
(Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1008 (1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-23-210
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time, however, a majority of the United States Supreme Court has
never addressed the question of whether there exists a constitutional
basis for a right not to be executed while insane.' Explanations for
the requirement of sanity at the time of execution vary widely, 4 but
there is little question that it is both historically and currently accepted.
Unlike other procedures involved in the capital punishment process, however, the process required when determining a condemned
prisoner's sanity has historically been left entirely to the discretion of
the states.5 This is due to the fact that no constitutional basis for the
right not to be executed while insane had ever been recognized by the
United States Supreme Court before the present case. 6 While the
Court has confronted the question, it has never held that such a
constitutional right exists. The cases in which the question arose date
back to the period in constitutional jurisprudence when the eighth
amendment had not yet been applied to the states through the
fourteenth amendment 7 and before the eighth amendment was found
to affect the procedural aspects of the death penalty.' The issue of
(Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-24 (1979); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-19-13 (1982); VA. CODE § 19.2-177 (1983); Wyo. STAT. § 7-13-901 (Supp.
1986). See also State v. Allen, 204 La. 513, 15 So.2d 870, 871 (1943); Commonwealth
v. Moon, 383 Pa. 18, 22-23, 117 A.2d 96, 99-100 (1955); Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn.
81, 90-91, 135 S.W. 327, 329-30 (1911); State v. Davis, 6 Wash. 2d 696, 717, 108
P.2d 641, 651 (1940) (dictum) (these states have adopted the same rule by case law);
IDAHO CODE § 19-2708, 2715, 2719 (1979) (only the governor can reprieve a death
sentence, except in the case of a pregnant woman).
3. Wainwright v. Ford, 104 S.Ct. 3498, 3498 (1984) (Justice Powell, concurring) (stated that the Court has never determined whether the Constitution prohibits
execution of the insane). The issue was raised but never decided in five cases between
1897 and 1958. See Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398 (1897); Phyle v. Duffy, 334
U.S. 431 (1948); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950) (held that "the Georgia
statute as applied is not a denial of due process of law" but avoiding issue of whether
there is a constitutional guarantee not to be executed while insane); United States ex
rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953); Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549
(1958).
4. The presently incompetent should not be executed because of their lack of
reason. II H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 384 (S. Thornes
trans. 1968). Coke wrote that it would be a miserable spectacle and would not deter
others. E. COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE 4,6 (London 1797) (1st ed. London 1644);
Blackstone said that madness was enough punishment and that one who could not
offer reasons why he should not be executed should be spared. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 24.

5. See supra note 2.
6. See supra note 3.
7. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (applied eighth amendment to
states through the fourteenth amendment).
8. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 355-58 (1977) (plurality opinion) (Court
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whether and how these current theories will be applied to those insane
prisoners awaiting execution takes on particular importance as executions in this country continue to increase in number.9
In recent years the Supreme Court has reviewed the requirements
for basic due process as it applies to state capital punishment procedures.' 0 In Ford v. Wainwright" the Supreme Court extended this
analysis to the procedures for determining the present sanity of
condemned prisoners and found that the right not to be executed
while insane is constitutionally guaranteed through the eighth amendment. 2 Since Ford v. Wainwright, state court procedures for determining the validity of claims of insanity from death row inmates must
comply, not only with the procedure necessary to withstand a habeas
corpus challenge, but with the full procedural safeguards necessary to
protect the prisoner's newly found constitutional right. 3
This note will examine existing case law precedent, found by the
Court not to control the issue raised by execution of the presently
insane, and the historical background of Ford v. Wainwright. The
note will then discuss the basis for the Court's decision in Ford v.
Wainwright. Issues raised by the concurring and dissenting opinions
which were not specifically addressed by the majority will be analyzed
as well. Finally, the probable implications affecting state procedure
in the area of executions of the insane in general will be considered,
with emphasis on the practical aspects of fulfilling a state's constitutional duty.
II.

PRIOR UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES

In the first of three cases in which the United States Supreme
Court considered execution of the presently insane, decided in 1897,
recognized that precedent upholding state capital punishment procedures against due
process challenges require review when challenged under the eighth amendment).
9. Reinhold. Lawyers Shunning Death Row Appeals, Chi. Daily L.J., Sep.

24, 1986, at 1, col. 2 (there are 1,765 death row prisoners as of Aug. 1, 1986, up
from 1,540 one year earlier; and 16 executions have been carried out so far this year,
resulting in a total of 66 executions since the states resumed the use of the penalty
in 1976).
10. Skipper v. South Carolina, 106 S.Ct. 1669 (1986); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (Court recognized that precedent upholding state capital
punishment procedures against due process challenges requires review when challenged
under the eighth amendment).
11. 106 S.Ct. 2595 (1986).
12. Id. at 2602.
13. Id. at 2603 ("Thus, the ascertainment of a prisoner's sanity as a predicate
to a lawful execution calls for no less stringent standards than those demanded in
any other aspect of a capital proceeding").
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the accused claimed a right to trial by jury to decide present competency.' 4 The questioned statute required the sheriff to initiate an

inquiry by a jury and, at his discretion, report those findings to the
sentencing court. 5 While the procedure to be used by the sentencing

court was not set out in the statute, it was implied by the Court that

fewer safeguards would be provided than were provided at the original
trial. 16 The Supreme Court held that since the common law had not
required a jury trial to decide incompetency, the states were under no
7
obligation to provide any particular procedures at this point. The
Court also noied that a convicted defendant could raise the insanity
issue time and time again, thus making it impracticable to use a
longer, more detailed proceeding, as the prisoner could delay execution
indefinitely. This would be possible because present insanity was being
decided, thus prior findings of sanity would not be dispositive if the

issue were raised again."
It was over fifty years later that the Court heard the issue again.
Solesbee v. Balkcom' 9 involved the same statute, however the wording
had been revised to state specifically that no statutory or constitutional
right to a trial existed in order to decide sanity after conviction.
According to the Court, the Georgia procedure constituted "an act
of grace" by the state, much like acts of reprieve or pardon, and was
not subject to due process requirements. 20 Dissenting in Solesbee,
Justice Frankfurter argued that, because the right not to be executed
while insane is constitutionally protected, Georgia should be precluded

14. Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398 (1897) (Elizabeth Nobles was the first
person to claim a right to jury trial on the issue of her sanity while awaiting execution;
her argument was based solely on the fourteenth amendment due process clause. The
Court rejected her claim by finding that at common law the decision was a discretionary one; therefore, "the manner in which such question should be determined
was purely a matter of legislative regulation." Id. at 409. The opinion placed great
weight on the possibility that by raising the issue again and again, the prisoner could
delay the execution indefinitely. The Court stated "[wlithout analysis of the contention, it might well suffice to demonstrate its obvious unsoundness by pointing to the
absurd conclusion which would result from its establishment." Id. at 405.).
15. Id. at 402-03 (whether the claim was even considered was completely at the
sheriff's discretion).
16. Id. at 405.
17. Id. at 409.
18. Id. at 405-06. "[A] finding that insanity did not exist at one time would
not be the thing adjudged as to its non-existence at another ....

""Id. at 405.

19. 339 U.S. 9 (1950).
20. Id. at 11-12 (Justice Black wrote "[sleldom, if ever, has this power of
executive clemency been subjected to review by the courts").
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from using insufficient procedures under the fourteenth amendment. 2 '
In 1958 the United States Supreme Court heard Caritativo v.
California22 and issued a one sentence opinion affirming the California
Supreme Court's decision that,23 under California statutory law, the
courts could not review a prisoner's sanity unless the warden of the
prison had previously initiated an inquiry. 24 In his concurring opinion,
Justice Harlan added that the California statute required the warden
to continually observe the prisoner's mental health and use good faith
when determining whether to hold a judicial inquiry.2 5 Justice Frankfurter dissented again, arguing that the prisoner's constitutional right
not to be executed while insane requires at least a mandatory hearing
on the issue. 26

III.

FORD V. WAINWRIGHT

27

A. THE FACTS OF THE CASE

Alvin Bernard Ford was convicted on December 17, 1974 for the
first degree murder of a Fort Lauderdale police officer.28 Following a
jury recommendation, Ford was sentenced to death on January 6,
1975. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed. 29
21. Id. at 17-21 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (discussed reasons, under fourteenth amendment analysis at that time, for finding a constitutional right not to be
executed while insane). Justice Frankfurter's analysis here and in Caritativo v.
California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958) (per curiam) is not unlike that used by the Court in
Ford v. Wainwright, 2595 U.S. at 2600-02.
22. Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958) (per curiam).
23. Caritativo v. Teets, 47 Cal. 2d 304, 303 P.2d 339 (1956), aff'd, 357 U.S.
at 550 (1958) (per curiam) ("The judgments are affirmed.") (the California court
held that warden must, in his discretion, determine that an appeal is necessary before
one is allowed under California procedure).
24. 357 U.S. at 550 (1958).
25. Id. at 550. However, as Justice Frankfurter pointed out, California law
provides no remedy "if the warden fails to perform the duties imposed upon him
.... Id. at 555.

26. Id. at 552 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Audi alteram partem-hear the
other side-a demand . .. spoken with the voice of the due process clause ... It is
beside the point that delay in the enforcement of the law may be entailed"). Id. at
558.
27. 106 S.Ct. 2595 (1986).
28. Ford v. Wainwright, 451 So.2d 471, 473 (Ford was convicted of murdering
a helpless, wounded police officer by shooting him in the back of the head after the
officer had given Ford the keys to a patrol car in Florida on July 21, 1974).
29. Id.
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3
After several merit appeals and collateral attacks, " Ford invoked
the Florida statute governing procedures that deal with a person under
3
the sentence of death who appears to be insane. Insanity had not

been an issue in any proceeding in Ford's case until this point in 1982.
At this time, Ford3 2began to show signs of a deteriorating psyche,
worsening steadily.

30. Ford v. State, 374 So.2d 496 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, Ford v. Florida, 445
U.S. 972 (1980) (direct appeal); Ford v. State, 407 So.2d 907 (Fla. 1981) (consolidated
original habeas corpus and collateral appeal in Florida Supreme Court); Ford v.
Strickland, 676 F.2d 434 (1 1th Cir. 1982), aff'd, Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804
(l1th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 201 (1983) (federal habeas corpus
petition was denied and the denial was affirmed); Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So.2d
1327 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1000 (1981) (case in which Ford was named
a party with 122 other death row inmates in a request for relief based upon an
accusation that certain documents which were considered by the court were not made
available to the defendants' counsel).
31. FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1986). The relevant portions read as follows:
(3) If the Governor decides that the convicted person does not have the
mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and why it is
to be imposed on him, he shall have him committed to a Department of
Corrections mental health treatment facility.
(4) When a person under sentence of death has been committed to a
Department of Corrections mental health treatment facility, he shall be kept
there until the facility administrator determines that he has been restored to
sanity. The facility administrator shall notify the Governor of his determination, and the Governor shall appoint another commission to proceed as
provided in subsection (1).
Id.
32. Ford, 106 S.Ct. at 2598-99; see also Brief for Petitioner at 4-8, Ford v.
Wainwright, 106 S.Ct. 2595 (1986) (No. 85-5542) (Ford believed that he was the
target of a conspiracy by the Ku Klux Klan and others to force him to commit
suicide. Ford believed the prisoA guards had been killing people and putting them in
the prison's bed enclosures and that his female relatives were being held and abused
there. Ford's delusion developed into what he saw as a hostage crisis, and he believed
135 of his friends, family, and various governmental leaders were being held. Ford
began to refer to himself as 'Pope John Paul, III'. He wrote a letter to the Attorney
General of Florida in which he appeared to assume control of the hostage crisis by
firing prison guards. Ford also claimed to have appointed nine justices to the Florida
Supreme Court.
Ford developed the belief that his first psychiatrist had joined the conspiracy
against him and his counselor; he procured a new one in 1983. Ford then revealed
that he believed he was free to go because his execution would be illegal, and because
he believed he had won a landmark case. Ford's psychiatrist found that Ford believed
he would not be executed and could not be executed because he had control over the
governor and owned the prisons. Moreover, his psychiatrist found that he did not
conceive the connection between his crime and execution. His psychiatrist found that
the symptoms were authentic. Ford regressed further until he began to speak in
incomprehensible code.
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The governor followed the statutory procedures, allowing three
psychiatrists to examine Ford in a joint meeting for thirty minutes in
order to determine whether he understood the death penalty and why
he was to be executed." Upon reviewing the two to three page reports
submitted by each psychiatrist, each of which contained a different
diagnosis but were in agreement on Ford's sanity as defined by 3state
4
law, the governor signed the death warrant without explanation.
Ford next applied to the Florida Supreme Court for a hearing
but was denied." Ford then filed a habeas corpus petition in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, and
was again denied without a hearing. The United States Court of
Appeals, however, granted a certificate of probable cause and stayed
the execution.3 6 The Supreme Court rejected Florida's attempt to
vacate the stay of execution.37 Upon hearing, the Court of Appeals
held that the Florida statute provided the minimum due process
required, however, they did so without deciding whether the right not
to be executed while insane was constitutionally mandated." The
3 9
United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari.
B.

THE SUPREME COURT OPINION

The Supreme Court decision recognized the underlying eighth
Florida's
amendment right not to be executed while insane, and 4found
° The Supreme
right.
statutory procedure inadequate in light of this
Court remanded the case to the4 District Court for a hearing de novo
on Ford's incompetence claim. '
The majority began by recognizing that since the Court had last
considered the rights of the presently insane awaiting execution,
33. Ford, 106 S.Ct. at 2599.
34, Id.
35. Ford v. Wainwright, 451 So.2d 471, 475 (Fla. 1984).
36. Ford v. Strickland, 734 F.2d 538 (11th Cir. 1984).
37. Wainwright v. Ford, 467 U.S. 1220 (1984) (Chief Justice Burger and Justices

Rehnquist and O'Connor would have granted the application to vacate the stay of
execution).
38. Ford v. Wainwright, 752 F.2d 526, 528 (11th Cir. 1985).

39. Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S.Ct. 566 (1985).

40. Ford, 106 S.Ct. at 2595 (authored by Justice Marshall, joined by Justices

Brennan, Blackmum, and Stevens, and also joined by Justice Powell with respect to
parts one and two in which the Court recognized the existence of an eighth amendment

right not to be executed while insane). It is interesting to note that the Court did not

necessarily have to find an eighth amendment right not to execute while insane in
order to find Florida's procedures inadequate. See infra note 72.
41. Id. at 2606.
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analysis of fourteenth amendment due process claims and eighth
amendment claims had undergone substantial evolution.42 Under present analysis, the eighth amendment proscribes procedural as well as
substantive standards."' Thus, the Court reasoned, it must be decided
whether a right not to be executed while insane can be found within
the bounds of the eighth amendment as applied to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. 44
The Supreme Court then outlined the relevant authority to the
effect that execution of the insane was considered cruel and unusual
punishment at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, applying the
older, "time of adoption" test 45 in order to show that even using this
strict analysis, the right not to be executed while insane is clearly
constitutionally mandated." Marshall went on to analyze the issues
under the more recently devised test which looks to contemporary
values, in order to determine the scope of the eighth amendment.4 7
The Court relied heavily on current state law and on the justifications
used at common law to define contemporary values, and found that
42. Id. at 2599-600; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (develops "contemporary standards of decency" and "dignity of man" criteria as parts of the eighth
amendment cruel and unusual test) (this case led states to stop executions for four
years); see also Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment: Furman v. Georgia, 1972
SuP. CT. REv. I (analyzes the nine opinions in the case).
43. Ford, 106 S.Ct. at 2602. However, the procedural aspect is contemporary,
as opposed to. historically based law.
44. Ford, 106 S.Ct. at 2600.
45. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). "There can be no doubt that the
Declaration of Rights guaranteed at least the liberties and privileges of the Englishmen." Id. at 285-86 n.10. The Court applied a proportionality test which weighed
the crime and the penalty, and in so doing relied heavily on what was considered
cruel and unusual at the time the eighth amendment was adopted.
46. Ford, 106 S.Ct. at 2600-03; e.g., State v. Vann, 84 N.C. 722 (1881); see 1
J. CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 525 (Philadelphia 1819);
F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRnMNAL LAW § 59, at 89 (8th ed. Philadelphia 1880)

(1st ed. Philadelphia 1846); I.

RAY,

A

TREATISE ON THE MEDICAl. JURISPRUDENCE OF

§ 252, at 265-66 (3d ed. Boston 1853) (1st ed. Boston 1838) (arguing reasons
for not executing the insane); See also CONN. LEGISLATURE JOINT COMM. RELATING
INSANITY

12 (1842); MASS. H.R. COMM., REPORTS ON THE ABOLITION
OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 35-36 (Boston 1837); O'SULLIVAN, REPORT IN FAVOR OF
ABOLITION OF THE PUNISHMENT OF DEATH BY LAW 46-47 (2d ed. New York 1841)
TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

(state commissions endorsing common law prohibition on executing the insane).
47. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1976) ("the Eighth Amendment
has not been regarded as a static concept" and "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that a maturing society" possesses); Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782, 788-89 (1982) (Court recognized human dignity as a contemporary
value.
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of finding the execution of the
all the evidence weighed in favor
48
insane to be cruel and unusual.
The majority continued by distinguishing the historical traditions
that give rise to the finding of an eighth amendment right from the
49
contemporary manner in which those rights are enforced. This places
the procedures due within the realm of those required in other habeas
corpus proceedings.5 0 Marshall goes further, however, by requiring
the same type of safeguards utilized in other stages of capital cases."
The need for these protections is greater still, Marshall reasoned,
because of the limited accuracy involved in determining mental state
and because the decision will turn on a single fact rather than on
equitable considerations.5 2 For these reasons, the Supreme Court
found Florida's statutory procedure inadequate." The Court went on
to point out the lack of any adversarial process in Florida's statutory
scheme, the fact that the process is carried out entirely by the executive
noting these as
branch, and the discretionary nature of the decision,
4
inquiry.
closer
a
prompt
should
that
factors
The majority then detailed specific areas where Florida's procedure is deficient. First, the prisoner is not included in the truth
seeking process; no relevant material may be submitted on behalf of
the prisoner." This infringes the prisoner's right to be heard and
increases the likelihood that probative information will be ignored in
the process of psychiatric evaluation, a process notorious for disagreement even among experts."
48. Ford, 106 S.Ct. at 2602.
49. Id. (the Court continues now without Justice Powell).
50. Id.; see also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (provides presumption
of correctness for facts found by a state court); Mattheson v. King, 751 F.2d 1432,
1447 (5th Cir. 1985) (Supreme Court deferred to state court's findings after an
evidentiary hearing, thereby avoiding issue of whether execution of insane violates
eighth amendment).
51. Ford, 106 S.Ct. at 2603 ("[t]he ascertainment of a prisoner's sanity calls
for no less stringent standards than those demanded in any other aspect of a capital

proceeding").
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2604-05.
55. Id.; see Exec. Order No. 83-197 (Dec. 9, 1983) (Governor Graham stated
that "Counsel for the inmate and the State Attorney may be present but shall not

participate in any adversarial manner").

56. Ford, 106 S.Ct. at 2604; see also Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1984)
("pyschiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness ...
there often is no single, accurate psychiatric conclusion on legal insanity in a given
case").
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The second deficiency observed by the Court is the complete lack
of opportunity for cross-examination of the state psychiatrists' opinions. 7 The purposes of cross-examining encompasses inquiry into the
history and competence of each psychiatrist and the meaning of words
used in each psychiatrist's report.5" Without cross-examination, the
Court concluded that the fact-finder's results would be distorted,
especially since Florida's single group interview examination procedure
is cursory and inflexible to the needs in each case. 9
The third defect, and the one most alarming to the Court, is the
placing of the decision whether to delay execution solely with the
discretion of the executive branch.60 Marshall pointed out that historically the decision was based on law, not discretion, and that no other
constitutional right had been left to the unreviewable discretion of
the executive branch. The Court found it strikingly inappropriate for
the "commander of the State's corps of prosecutors" to be in charge
of a procedure such as this in light of the probable lack of neutrality
possessed by the one in charge of the entire process which condemned
the prisoner in the first instance and whose interest is in enforcing
sentences .61
Although the Court found the Florida procedure inadequate, it
did not adopt a procedure requiring a full trial, but rather left to the
states the task of developing procedures that protect the individual's
eighth amendment rights while protecting the state's interest in carrying out the death sentence. 62 The Court suggested that the state's
own procedure in other areas where insanity is an issue might provide
a possible alternative.63
Justice Powell joined Parts I and II of the Court's opinion,
agreeing that an eighth amendment right exists; however, in his
concurring opinion he found it necessary to define the meaning of
insanity for a condemned prisoner in order to clearly define that
57. Ford, 106 S.Ct. at 2605.
58. Id. ("Without some question of the experts concerning their technical
conclusions, a fact finder simply cannot be expected to evaluate the various opinions,
particularly when they are themselves inconsistent"). See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463
U.S. 880, 899 (1983).
59. Ford, 106 S.Ct. at 2605; Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (recognized
sensitivity to the individual as a factor in determining whether due process had been
served).
60. Ford, 106 S.Ct. at 2605.
61. Id.

62. Id. at 2606; Justice Powell interpreted the Court's opinion to require a full
trial. Id. at 2610.
63. Id. at 2606 n.4; See infra note 143.
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right.6 Powell did not find the prisoner's ability to assist in his own
defense necessary at this stage in the proceedings. Rather, he found
it more persuasive that the punishment is cruel and unusual because
the prisoner may be unable to prepare for death, and the state's
retributive goal is not served by executing one who cannot comprehend
the connection between his crime and the punishment to be imposed
for it. 6 Therefore, Powell would allow a stay of execution only for
those who do not realize that they are to be executed and do not
understand the reason for their punishment. 6 Powell concluded that
since Ford believed the death penalty had been invalidated and that
he would not be executed, he did not perceive the connection between
his crime and the execution. Since this was the standard used by
Florida, the question remains as to whether the claim was judged
fairly under due process standards. 67
Powell disagreed with Marshall on the issue of what is required
in order to satisfy due process. Powell argued that fewer safeguards
are required because the prisoner's guilt is not in question, and for
this reason the heightened requirements utilized in other capital proceedings do not apply. 68 Further, there should be a presumption of
sanity because the prisoner had been judged competent at earlier
stages in the process.6 9 Also, the subjective nature of a determination
of sanity is not conducive to the adversarial process. Powell concluded
that an impartial officer or board observing basic fairness and allowing an opportunity for the prisoner's arguments to be heard would
be all that due process requires, leaving the precise limits within the
70
province of state law.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice White, disagreed with the
Court's conclusion that the right not to be executed while insane is
guaranteed by the eighth amendment. 71 However, since the states
create by statute a protected liberty interest in granting stays to the
presently incompetent death row prisoners, the due process clause
requirements must be met. 72
64. Id. at 2606-07.

65. Id. at 2607-09.

66. Id. at 2609.
67. Id.

68. Id. at 2610. ("the only question raised is not whether, but when, his
execution may take place . . . . [I]t is not comparable to the antecedent question
whether petitioner should be executed at all").
69. Id. See infra note 144.
70. Ford, 106 S.Ct. at 2611.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2611-12; See infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text. The majority
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Since O'Connor would give wide latitude to the states, due to
the nature of the interest, the only way Florida's procedure is deficient
is in its failure to allow an opportunity to be heard. She observed
that, at least, the petitioner's written submissions should be reviewed.73
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger in dissent,
argued that the type of procedures Florida uses to determine sanity
are more in keeping with the nature of the right as it existed both
historically and presently. 74 Rehnquist also argued that laws traditionally do not create eighth amendment rights.
The dissenters further found that no basis existed for the right
created by the statute other than the discretion of the governor to
grant a stay." Further, they argued that due process would be satisfied
in any event by executive procedures because of the late stage in the
proceedings, and the needless complications and postponements which
76
would result from a more detailed process.
C.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

The opinion of the Court in Ford v. Wainwright specifically
considered, for the first time, the question of whether the right not
to be executed while insane is constitutionally guaranteed. 77 The Court
correctly decided that it is guaranteed; by applying both the older,
narrower test which asks whether it was considered cruel and unusual
at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, and by applying the
present more liberal "contemporary standards of decency" and "human dignity" test. The Court cites overwhelming evidence that both
78
tests are satisfied.
Contrary to the dissent's claim, the majority does not "cast aside
settled precedent" because the eighth amendment had not been applied
to the states at the time the prior cases were decided. 79 In light of the
eighth amendment's intervening incorporation into the fourteenth
also recognized that even in the absence of the eighth amendment right, Florida's
procedure is constitutionally insufficient. Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S.Ct. at 2604.
73. Id. at 2613.
74. Id. at 2613-14.
75. Id. at 2615. (Rehnquist cites "if the Governor decides" as statutory
language which precludes the individual from forming a legitimate expectation of
anything but the governor's discretion).
76. Id. at 2615.
77. See supra note 3.
78. Ford, 106 S.Ct. at 2602.
79. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (Court applied the eighth
amendment to the states).
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amendment as against the states,80 the Ford v. Wainwright test of

cruel and unusual punishment properly reflects current constitutional
standards. 8 Since Solesbee and the other cases involving execution of
the insane never considered the question,8 2 the Court was doctrinally

compelled to start with a fresh analysis.

The dissent would have the Court recognize a right not to be
executed while insane that is "historically" 3 tied to executive discre84
tion, as has been employed by the states to implement this right.
What the dissent fails to recognize, however, is that at common law
the decision whether to execute an insane person was in fact not
discretionary but one of law. 8 In addition, the Court's established
tests look only to the punishment and not to procedure. Since the
Court has established a clear constitutional basis for the right, that

right must be enforced in accordance with modern procedural require-

ments. 86 Execution of an insane prisoner pursuant to insufficient
procedural safeguards violates the prisoner's eighth amendment rights.
The dissent finds it unnecessary to constitutionalize the currently
accepted view.8 7 But in the absence of a constitutional basis for the
right, the states would be free to execute insane prisoners simply by
repealing the state laws that currently grant that right. The state law

uniformly providing for such a right is used by the dissent to show
that a constitutional basis for the right is not required.8 8 State accept-

80. Before this evolution took place, the Court held that the due process clause
did not apply to sentencing proceedings. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,
245-46 (1949).
81. See supra notes 7, 8.
82. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950) ("At the outset we lay aside the
contention that execution of an insane person is a type of "'cruel and unusual
punishment' forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment"); Caritativo v. California
357 U.S. 549 (1958) (one sentence opinion citing Solesbee); Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S.
431, (1948) (state judicial remedy available so Court did not decide due process
question); Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398 (1897) (no right to jury on insanity issue).
83. But see Ex Parte Chesser, 93 Fla. 291, 111 So. 720 (1927); Hysler v. State,
136 Fla. 563, 187 So. 261 (1939) (these Florida courts prior to enactment of current
statute held that there was a right to a judicial determination by a judge when a
condemned person was allegedly incompetent).
84. Ford, 106 S.Ct. at 2613.
85. 1 N. WALKER, CRIME AND INSANrrY IN ENGLAND 196 (1968).
86. Ford, 2595 S.Ct. at 2602.
87. Id. at 2615.
88. Id. ("The Court reaches the result it does by examining the common law,
creating a constitutional right that no State seeks to violate, and then concluding that
the common-law procedures are inadequate ... I find it unnecessary to 'constitutionalize' the already uniform view . . ").
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ance of a right should not preclude the Court's finding that the right
is constitutionally guaranteed, however. Rather, the uniform view
should be evidence of contemporary standards of decency and weigh
toward recognizing a constitutional basis for the right. This constitutional basis is important, without it any state could begin to execute
the presently insane regardless of any "uniform view" possessed by
the other states.
The Court's next logical step was to decide what process is due
9°
and whether Florida's statute provides sufficient safeguards. The
Court wisely opted to allow the states to determine the specific
procedures to be employed, while setting out workable guidelines and
9
suggesting state insanity procedures in other contexts as models. '
As Justice Powell pointed out, the court failed to address the
crucial issue of how 'insanity' will be defined in the death row
context.Y Perhaps this is because the Court is indecisive about the
actual purpose for allowing the stay for those found insane, or perhaps
the deficiencies found in Florida's procedure are the only issues
requiring consideration because Florida's definition of insanity is
sufficient. 93 In any event, the right is left undefined, and states will
be required not only to adopt proper procedures, but to decipher
what is meant by 'insane' according to the federal constitutional law.
This approach could have been avoided by adopting Justice Powell's
well reasoned analysis of the definition of insanity contained in his
concurring opinion. 94 Whether the Court will ultimately accept Powell's definition which "forbids the execution only of those who are
unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are
about to suffer it" 95 is a question which the Court will, in all
likelihood, face again, perhaps when confrontation is more directly
required by the facts.

89. Id. at 2601-02.
90. Id. at 2605-06.

91. Id. at 2606 n.4.
92. Id. at 2606-07; Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536-37 (1968) (dictum)
(plurality opinion) (Court voices a preference not to set down a uniform test for
insanity, for a uniform rule would "reduce, if not eliminate,

. .

. fruitful experimen-

tation, and freeze the developing productive dialogue between law and psychiatry
. . . .11).

93. LAFAvE AND SCoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMiNAL LAW 303 (1972) (the prisoner
"must be so unsound mentally as to be incapable of understanding the nature and
purpose of the punishment about to be executed upon him").
94. Ford, 106 S.Ct. at 2607-09.
95. Id. at 2609.
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The only concrete guidelines given by the Court are those that
can be gleaned from the Court's recitation of the flaws in Florida's
procedure. From this, it is evident that the prisoner must be allowed
to present relevant evidence to the finder of fact,9 that some sort of
cross-examination of the state's witnesses is required, 97 and that the
decision must be in the hands of a tribunal that is subject to review. 98
In the next section, this note will examine what additional safeguards
are implicitly required by Ford v. Wainwright.
IV.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF

DUE PROCESS

Since there exists a constitutional right through the eighth amendment not to be executed while insane, the actual process utilized in a
state proceeding to determine present competency should be analyzed
and reconsidered in a manner that recognizes the weight of both the
state's interest in capital punishment and the more recently recognized
individual interest in the right not to be so executed.99 Prior to Ford
v. Wainwright, this right was granted by state law.1 ° While due
process requirements differ between state created rights and constitutionally mandated ones, they are at least analogous. Since the late
1970's, the Court has used a balancing test approach to determine
what procedures 4re due in notice, hearing and other phases of process
in cases involving state created rights.10' On one side the Court
balances the strength of the private interest that would be affected by
the action, the "risk of erroneous deprivation of such an interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards." 2 After arriving at
some multiplier, the Court balances this factor against the govern96. Id.at 2604.
97. Id. at 2605.
98. Id. (Powell believed Marshall required a "full trial" on the issue of present
insanity).
99. Id.at 2610.
100. For an excellent overview of the procedures that would be due in the
absence of an eighth amendment right, see Note, Insanity of the Condemned, 88
YALE L.J. 533 (1979); For a more conservative view of the same issue, see Hazard &
Louisell, Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L. REv. 381

(1962).
101. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 434 (1982); Memphis
Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1978); Dixon v. Love, 431
U.S. 105, 112-15 (1977); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); contra Goldberg

v. Kelly, 397 U.S. (1970) (while analogous, these cases do not directly consider capital
punishment issues).
102. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 322.
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ment's interest, including the cost and complexity of particular procedural requirements.o 3
Ford v. Wainwright, however, has elevated the right not to be
executed while insane to the level of other capital punishment procedures, so heightened safeguards are necessary. Finding an irremediable
life interest at stake, the Court held that such procedures must achieve
"a heightened standard of reliability". '4 The procedural safeguards
required in this context must closely resemble those standards employed at other stages of capital punishment proceedings.' 5
In capital punishment cases the Court traditionally has considered
such factors as "social cost",°6 "sensitivity to the individual",107 and
the assurance that the penalty imposed is neither discriminatory nor
arbitrary.1° 8 Similarly, in determining whether an indigent defendant
has a right to the assistance of a psychiatrist in preparing a defense
at trial, the Court has established three governing factors which
103. Id. at 322. Thus a mathematical formula might be derived such that the
probability of error reduction multiplied by the insane prisoner's interest in remaining
alive while insane must be greater or equal to the overall cost to the government
both administratively and fiscally in order for the Court to require additional
procedures. According to this test, present state procedures to determine the mental
competency of prisoners on death row are generally insufficient.
104. 106 S.Ct. at 2603; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976);
Solesbee v. Balkom, 339 U.S. 9, 23 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("It cannot
be that the Court is more concerned about property losses that are not irremediable
than about irretrievable human claims"). In determining whether a judical hearing
was necessary in this context, one commentator balanced the potential for error, the
appropriateness of using a judicial hearing to decide present insanity, and the ability
of the courts to ensure compliance with the eighth amendment against the administrative or fiscal benefits derived from a nonjudicial hearing. Note, The Eighth
Amendment and the Execution of the Presently Incompetent, 32 STAN. L. REv. 765,
801-03 (1980). While this test may give a basis, or bare minimum to argue for certain
procedural safeguards, it seems there are more powerful arguments available than
the type used in property interest cases, especially when the Court has repeatedly
pointed out the severity of the death penalty and then demanded heightened safeguards. See Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S.Ct. at 2603; Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S.
447 (1984).
105. Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S.Ct. at 2603.
106. Spaziano v. Florida 468 U.S. 447, 456 (1984) (case which found that there
is no constitutional right to a binding jury determination in the sentencing process
of a capital proceeding; the jury's determination is advisory unless state law provides
otherwise).
107. Id. at 464.
108. Id. at 459, 464 (also required a "measured, consistent application and
fairness to the accused"); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (joint opinion)
(Marshall, J., concurring) ("where life hangs in the balance, a fine precision must
be insisted upon").

1986:89]

EXECUTION OF THE INSANE

include the weight of the private interest to be affected, the governmental interest affected if the safeguards are implemented, and the
probability of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if
those safeguards are not provided. 1' 9 Guided by considerations such
as these, then, courts must fashion due process requirements that
adequately protect the fundamental life interest of the presently insane

death row inmate.

V.

PROCEDURE

A. RIGHT TO COUNSEL

At the very base of due process rests the requirement of adequate
notice." 0 The usual acts of notice, however, are entirely insufficient
if, in fact, the prisoner is insane."' The purpose of notice is to inform
the prisoner of the nature of the procedure about to take place and
the time frame in which it will take place, in order to allow the
prisoner the opportunity to prepare for this proceeding. Because the

insane prisoner may lack the ability to comprehend the situation
presented, the purpose of notice will often be frustrated by his inability
to utilize the information provided. 1 2 Notice of sanity proceedings,
of the probable delay of execution, and of the standards against which

109. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77-78 (1984) ("The private interest in the
accuracy of a criminal proceeding that places an individual's life or liberty at risk is
almost uniquely compelling"). These interests should be compared to the interests
which the Court considers in the statutory entitlement context. See supra notes 10104 and accompanying text. The difference is in the governmental interests which the
Court finds compelling in each case. For instance, it is unlikely that the Court would
consider the dollar cost to the state very persuasive as a factor in favor of a procedure
that might cause even a slight increase in erroneous decisions to execute insane
prisoners.
110. The Florida statute dealing with involuntary commitment that the Court
holds out as an "instructive analogy" requires notice to the mentally ill person's
guardian or representative. Ford, 106 S.Ct. at 2606 n.4; FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (Supp.
1986). See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 349 (furnishing recipients of
disability benefits prior review and response to administrative action); Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co. 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (required immediate full hearing following
execution of sequestration writ).
11. Note, Insanity of the Condemned, 88 YALE L.J. 533, 555-57 (1979). See'l
M. MERRM, MERRML ON NOTICE § 8 (1952) (enumerating acts of notice to be "recording
an instrument, publishing a 'notice', posting a placard, delivering a document, mailing
a letter, maintaining litigation in relation to property." or "The requisite act may be
the formal bringing home a communication concerning the subject matter to the one
notified") (footnotes omitted).
112. See generally Note, Insanity of the Condemned, 88 YALE L.J. 533 (1979).
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sanity will be assessed is meaningless to one who is without adequate
understanding. The very individual whose rights are most in need of
protection will be the most vulnerable without proper assistance.
Indeed it may be argued, that under such circumstances, no notice in
3

fact ever occurred."
In order to accomplish the purpose intended to be served by
notice of proceedings, the mentally incompetent prisoner must be
provided with counsel at a point near the execution date." 4 In the
absence of such assistance, reliance on custodial personnel to raise
the issue of insanity could conceivably allow an insane death row
inmate to be executed simply because no mandatory procedures
required that the custodian do so." 5 An automatic procedure may
prove too burdensome in comparison to the relatively effective procedure of appointing counsel to consider each prisoner's need to claim

insanity."16

113. Psychosis has definite effects on perception. Musselwhite v. State, 215 Miss.
363, 367, 60 So.2d. 807, 809 (1952) ("Amid the darkened mists of mental collapse,
there is no light against which the shadows of death may be cast. It is revealed that
if he were taken to the electric chair, he would not quail or take account of its
significance.").
114. Looking to a statutory entitlement type balancing test, it can be argued
that the high probability of error in attempting to effectively notify an insane prisoner
and the prisoner's attempt to effectively utilize this knowledge coupled with the
prisoner's interest in life which is at stake far outweighs the cost caused to the
government. Thus, even in the absence of an eighth amendment basis, it seems at
least as much should be required.
115. Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 459 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
110-111 (1982) (Court required "measured, consistent application"). In order to
ensure this application the prisoner should not have to depend on the discretion (and
diligence) of the custodial officer. This seems self-evident since the Court is not even
willing to allow the governor to decide the insanity issue in a discretionary manner
after the matter has been investigated and a report made to him. To allow the
custodial officer discretion as to when to raise the claim puts an unnecessary roadblock
in the way of later procedures. Even the meager procedures followed in Ford's case
would be meaningless if his custodial officer had the discretion to and did not raise
his claim (if Ford was without counsel and in need of some third party willing to
raise the issue on his behalf). 'Assurance' is not provided if ability to raise the
insanity issue in the absence of an attorney or a willing third party is dependent on
a discretionary decision. This is especially true in light of the recent trend among
attorneys to shun death row appeals. Reinhold, LAWYERS SHUNNING DEATH Row
APPEALS, Chi. Daily L.J., Sep. 24, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
116. The issue should be raised through either a mandatory hearing or some
other mandatory mechanism. Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of
the Presently Incompetent, 32 STAN. L. REv. 765, 798-800 (1980) (argues for a
mandatory trial on the issue of insanity, a "postconviction mechanism", and permitting someone to assert the issue on the prisoner's behalf as ways to raise the
insanity issue).
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Assistance of counsel over the entire death row period will allow
the insane prisoner the opportunity and capability to initiate the
inquiry under state law or file the proper habeas corpus forms." 7 The

attorney can file the forms personally in the proper circumstances,
and the state could place some responsibility for frivolous claims
upon the attorney. Counsel need not be available for every purpose
during this period, but rather should be limited to the pre-trial
interview or to those occasions when the question of a prisoner's

insanity is raised through another means." 8

Counsel is also necessary at the point of hearing,"

9

whatever

form it might take, because the prisoner may not be capable of

knowing when or how to challenge either the inadequacy of the

process or an alleged erroneous finding. If a judicial hearing is not
utilized, the need for counsel increases. In view of the fact that only
fifty-four percent of psychiatrists usually agree on a given diagnosis,

20

reliance on impartial expert analysis alone can increase the risk of

error. Unlike most other proceedings, errors not immediately discovered at this level become irreversible upon execution of punishment.' 21

While the low cost of written records make them appealing, later
review is no substitute for the immediate adversarial examination and
cross-examination of witnesses.'2
B.

THE FIRST HEARING

A prisoner's claim of insanity while on death row is peculiar in
that, upon a finding of sanity, the prisoner may raise the issue again
117. Contra Shriner v. Wainwright, 735 F.2d 1236, 1240-41 (lth Cir. 1984)
(habeas corpus petitioner will be held to have waived his right to present facts and
claims as were known to him upon counsel's negligent or deliberate failure to assert
such facts and claims on his behalf), app. denied, 467 U.S. 1257 (1984). In this case,
however, the 'as were known to him' requirement could not be met due to the insane
prisoner's effective lack of notice. See supra text accompanying note 112-13.
118. A mandatory pre-execution attorney-prisoner interview would satisfactorily
assure that a meritorious claim is not ignored simply because the prisoner is truly
incompetent and cannot raise the issue personally. See supra text accompanying note
115.
119. Cf. Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299 (1983) (assesses the effectiveness of
counsel based on the Supreme Court's procedural guidelines for constitutional
imposition of the death penalty and concludes that, in light of the severity of the
punishment, the definition of "reasonably competent counsel" in the sentencing stage
of a capital proceeding involves more stringent requirements than in other contexts).
120.

J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY

183

(2d ed. 1975).
121. Cf. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (Court recognizes that an
execution, once carried out, cannot be corrected or modified).
122. See Ford, 106 S.Ct. at 2605.
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and again. 123 Fear that the system will be manipulated in this way has
led many courts to conclude that a process designed to protect
prisoners' rights must be compromised in order to allow the states to
continue to employ capital punishment. 124 Implementation of this
conclusion has led to widespread reliance upon a warden's or governor's discretionary judgment in deciding when a prisoner should be
allowed to show present incompetency or upon the same discretion in
5
12
deciding whether the prisoner is, in fact, insane.
In order to ensure that the prisoner's constitutional rights are not
infringed, at the very least, a judicial inquiry into present competency
26
should be made on those claims which are most likely to be valid.
Since it is the prisoner who insists upon repeated claims and subsequent hearings which tend to cause the greatest delay and expense, if
a compromise is to be made, it should be made at the expense of the
repeating claimant. In order to accomplish these competing goals, it
is necessary to analyze what process is due at a first hearing, and
then to decide what safeguards can be retained in a more expedited
system dealing with subsequent claims.
A judicial inquiry is the best alternative for the initial hearing
for a number of reasons. First, while a panel of psychiatrists can
analyze, if not agree upon, factual medical aspects of the prisoner's
competency, they should not be expected to apply the law and arrive
at formal legal conclusions regarding the prisoner's rights. 27 Present
123. Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the Presently Incom-

petent, 32 STAN. L. REV. 765, 703 (1980).

124. See Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549, 551 (1958) (Harlan, J., concurring); Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 405-06 (1897); Phyle v. Duffy, 34 Cal. 2d
144, 163, 208 P.2d 668, 679 (Traynor, J., concurring), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 895
(1949).
125. See supra note 2.
126. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 359 (1977) ("no better instrument has
been derived for arriving at the truth"); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (explains importance
of judicial inquiry) ("The validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend
on the mode by which it was reached. Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking and
self-righteousness gives too slender an assurance of rightness. No better instrument
has been devised for arriving at truth .. .). It would seem that frivolous claims are

equally likely whether it is the first time a prisoner has raised the claim or not. It is
not the first claim that puts the greatest burden on the states' ability to carry out the
death sentence, however. It is the continuous raising of claims that could cause
endless delay. See supra note 18. Later claims must be heard only when they are
most likely valid. This could be effectuated through a certificate of probable cause
requirement to raise the issue on subsequent claims.
127. See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INsANrry DEFENSE 59-60 (1967); Comment, An End
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competency in the capital punishment context does not necessarily
mean the same thing as psychosis or 'mental illness' generally. Some
forms of mental illness do not effect the ability to comprehend or to
make decisions, and therefore should not be considered in this context.'12 Psychiatrists' opinions without judicial review can be unreliable
and uncertain, tending to err with a bias toward institutionalization. 129
Allowing a warden to review a psychiatrist's report would not appear
to add any greater reliability; a warden is not necessarily more aware
of the law than a psychiatrist, and may likewise possess an institutional
bias. 130 A judicial hearing, however, allows for review in light of
existing law and provides an opportunity for the benefits of the
adversarial process.' Specifically, arbitrary acceptance of psychiatric
opinion would be diminished and responsibility for the final decision
with respect to the legal question would be placed in the hands of a
judge. 3 2 While a jury trial may not be vital at this stage due to limited
factual questions and added expense, it can be fairly stated that a
judicial hearing is necessary. 33 A finding of sanity pushes the prisoner
down the road to execution as necessarily as the initial death sentence
and the prisoner should be afforded whatever due process is possible
to Incompetency to Stand Trial, 13 SANTA CLARA L. REv., 560, 560-61 (1973)
(psychiatrists tend to consider 'psychosis' rather than the legal definition at issue);
See generally Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALI. L. lEv. 693 (1974) (explains reasons why
psychiatric judgments are unreliable and therefore invalid, and why nonjudicial
commitment should never be used).
128. Some forms of paranoia and infrequent delusions do not effect most forms
of comprehension, and 'lucid periods' are recognized in contract law as periods when
an incompetent is able to function for purposes of making a contract.
129. This would have especially important affects in the present procedural
situation. Without a judicial hearing a psychiatrist could exercise his or her bias
without having this bias revealed through the scrutiny of cross-examination.
130. See Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty
Statutes, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1690, 1712 (1974) (a discretionary decision makes
arbitrariness more likely, especially if prior decisions were made judicially).
131. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1970).
132. Other benefits of the adversarial process include increased disclosure of the
reasons for decision, the opportunity for one trained in the law and accustomed to
applying the law to decide the issue, and the ability to question inconsistent and
vague conclusions sometimes reached by psychiatrists. The flaws in Florida's procedure which were noted by the Court are those that are curable through a hearing
mechanism. Ford, 106 S.Ct. at 2604-05.
133. D. ROBINSON, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 206 (1980) (makes proposal that "[a]ll
statements regarding the mental state of the accused or any party to litigation are to
be treated as statements of belief or opinion. They are not to be accorded the status
of evidence . . . ").
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in light of potential abuses.' 3 4 Because little deterrent or retributive
value result, the state has no interest in executing an insane prisoner.' 35
Rather the states' interests lie in fiscal economy and in the speedy
execution of those sentenced to death who are not insane.13 6 At least
at the time of the prisoner's initial claim, due process will not be
served by less than a judicial hearing.'
C.

SUBSEQUENT CLAIMS

In order to overcome the possibly prohibitive costs of allowing a
prisoner to raise repeatedly the issue of insanity, subsequent claims
must necessarily be dealt with in a fashion less burdensome to the
states' interest in efficiency and in carrying out the death penalty. 3 8
This will not only hasten the processing of claims, but may diminish
incentive for the prisoner to claim insanity when the claim has no
merit.139 While a prior finding of sanity should not impact conclusively
on a later inquiry, '40 practicality dictates that this earlier finding must

influence the procedures utilized to determine whether a subsequent

claim is frivolous. As an additional rationale it could be found that

by raising frivolous claims of insanity, a prisoner 'waives' certain
procedural rights; for example, the automatic right to a judicial

134. See supra text accompanying note 18.
135. Ford, 106 S.Ct. at 2601-02.
136. E.g., Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the Presently
Incompetent, 32 STAN. L. REv. 765, 800-01 (1980).
137. Id. at 802.
138. Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S.Ct. at 2606 ("legitimate pragmatic considerations may also supply the boundaries of the procedural safeguards that feasibly can
be provided"). See also Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. at 405-06 (1897); Caritativo v.
California, 357 U.S. at 551 (1958).
139. While it may be true that a death row inmate is desperate and may resort
to any avenue in order to delay execution, an attorney who is not only responsible
for frivolous claims but who may put his or her client in a less advantageous position
when the client later actually becomes insane will likely counsel the client to forgo
raising the issue until it is reasonably thought to have some merit.
140. Ford, 106 S.Ct. at 2610 ("The State therefore may properly presume that
petitioner remains sane at the time sentence is to be carried out, and may require a
substantial threshold showing of insanity merely to trigger the hearing process")
(footnote omitted); Welch v. Beto, 355 F.2d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir.) Cert. denied 385
U.S. 839 (1966) (Prior determinations are "hardly helpful in forming a judgment as
to whether there is a reasonable doubt as to the sanity"). See generally Note, Insanity
of the Condemned, 88 YALE L.J. 533, 560 n.160 (1979). But see Drope v. Missouri,
420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975) (Earlier medical opinion on competence to stand trial
considered when determining whether later inquiry is necessary).
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inquiry into the issue of present sanity. 4 ' Or it could be analogized
to the one time automatic appeal to the state's highest court after a
sentence of death, after which the appeals become discretionary.
Regardless of the rationale employed, some precision must ulti-

mately be sacrificed in order to maintain the use of current capital
punishment laws.

42

Under these circumstances, due process requires

fewer procedural safeguards after an initial finding of sanity. Of
course, by way of the same analysis, a finding of insanity while on

death row followed by hospitalization and treatment which leads to
reinstatement of the punishment, should not preclude the prisoner

from the full procedural protection afforded to his initial claim.
Seemingly unfounded subsequent claims, however, may be dealt with
through somewhat discretionary procedures similar to those presently

used by the states. A panel of appointed psychiatrists could interview
the prisoner and submit written findings. 143 Records from prior insanity proceedings could be reviewed to aid in the determination of
whether changes have occurred which merit de novo review. In
addition, writings submitted by any interested party could become

part of the record. The party making the decision to review subsequent

claims, perhaps a governor or a warden, should be required to support

all decisions with a written record, allowing judicial review of such

denial. The reviewing court should be required to give substantial
deference to this discretionary determination. 44 In order to begin the
141. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934) (right to represent oneself
effectively lost through misconduct). In this case perhaps the court could require
knowledge that the claim is frivolous before finding waiver. See also North Carolina
v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (implicit waiver sufficient to waive constitutional right
to Miranda warning).
142. Comment, Execution of Insane Persons, 23 So. CAL. L. REv. 246, 252,
256 (1950) (writes in favor of a statutory presumption of sanity as a "practical
expedient").
143. Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. at 2606 n.4 (the Court cites current Florida
statutes in other areas of "instructive analogies"). The first of these sections speaks
to appointment of an expert panel in competency to stand trial situations; two to
three experts may be appointed. FLA. STAT. § 916.11 (1985 and Supp. 1986). Florida
case law has established that these experts are to be 'neutral'. Chapman v. State, 391
So. 2d 744 (Fla. App. 1980). The definition of insanity in competency to stand trial
cases hinges on a present ability to aid in one's defense and an understanding of the
proceedings.FLA. STAT. § 916.12 (1985 and Supp. 1986). This would seem to unnecessarily broaden Powell's definition. Ford, 106 at 2609; see supra text accompanying
note 66. These are specifically pointed to as only analogies by the Court and should
be used in that context. The prisoner may also be entitled to the assistance of
psychiatrist while on death row. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
144. Florida law at the present time puts a presumption of sanity on a defendant
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appeal process, a certificate of probable cause, placing the burden to
show merit upon the prisoner, should be required.1 45 This would
further expedite the process while continuing to protect the prisoner's
rights to the extent necessary to satisfy due process.'4
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Ford v. Wainwright found that the eighth
amendment prohibits execution of the presently insane by looking to
both the overwhelming acceptance of the right at common law and
current acceptance by the states. The fourteenth amendment provides
that this right cannot be limited through processes that fall below
those deemed to be constitutionally sufficient. Accordingly, procedural due process standards for death row inmates who are faced
with a deprivation of life while insane must be revised to comport
with present due process requirements. Like all procedures dealing
with life and death situations, sufficient safeguards must be implemented in order to assure that erroneous and discriminatory decisions
are not made. This can best be effectuated through a system that
utilizes a judicial hearing, the right to counsel, and the right to a
psychiatrist, along with an accelerated process for subsequent claims
of insanity which are a likely vehicle for attempts to unnecessarily
delay execution.
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as to the issue of competence to stand trial. Flowers v. State, 353 So. 2d 1259 (Fla.

App. 1978).
145. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (judicial determination of probable
cause may be required but full adversary hearing not necessary in deprivation of
liberty case); Bowlen v. Scafati, 395 F.2d 692, 693 (lst Cir. 1968) (probable cause

places "a burden of affirmative showing of merit" upon petitioner); Foquette v.
Bernard, 198 F.2d 96, 97 (9th Cir. 1952) (found it a mockery of justice to execute a
prisoner after a finding of probable cause); See generally Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the Presently Incompetent, 32 STAN. L. REV. 765, 803

(1980).
146. Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2606 ("It may be that some high threshold showing on
behalf of the prisoner will be found necessary to control the number of nonmeritorious
or repetitive claims of insanity") (emphasis added).

